East Valley School District (Spokane) — WA

1. Snapshot

City-Midsize district in the Spokane Valley east of the city — 3,601 students across 9 schools. SAIPE poverty 11.6%, demographics 72% White / 14% Hispanic / 8% Multiracial. Per-pupil expenditure $17,056 — middle of the WA peer band. Median household income $64,042 (well below the state median ~$84K) and 64% owner-occupied: this is a blue-collar Spokane-Valley community next door to West Valley SD (its closest peer) and just east of Spokane Public Schools.

2. Why this was a hard sell — community context (ACS)

This is the lowest-income community in the WA cohort — a $64K median household weighing a $220M bond with the 60% supermajority overhead is structurally hard, but 54.6% Yes says voters showed up for this measure. Compared to North Kitsap’s 36% Yes (where the community walked away), East Valley won the public-opinion fight. The 60% rule didn’t lose them an election — it converted a clear majority into a defeat. 5.4 percentage points is the gap to close.

3. Peer comparison

Top-10 peers via MCP (default weights + 0.20 plantOps emphasis). FMX-customer status now resolved against opted-in local benchmarking server.

Confirmed FMX customers in top 15 (3): Plum Borough SD (PA), Ephrata Area SD (PA), Upper Moreland Township SD (PA).

4. The gap story (what the data would have shown voters)

The bond materials per Spokesman-Review coverage centered on building ages (64- and 56-year-old buildings) and a sentimental superintendent farewell — “Lift our chins; that’s what we do in East Valley.” The data EVSD didn’t lead with:

• Plant operations spending: $1,497.99 / pupil vs national median $1,324 — EVSD already invests 13% above the median on facilities upkeep. Voters who suspected the district was wasting money were arguing with the wrong line item. The narrative should have been “we’ve been responsibly maintaining buildings that need to be replaced — here’s the maintenance line, here’s the replacement need, they aren’t the same problem.”
• Capital construction outlay (FY2020): $633,000 total — across 9 schools. That confirms there is no live capital program — the bond is the only mechanism. Voters needed to see that number; the operations-vs-replacement distinction is the bond pitch.
• Per-pupil instruction $9,156.81 — slightly higher than West Valley (its 4-mile neighbor) at $8,571, even though EVSD has lower median household income. The classroom is being prioritized; the buildings are not.
• East Valley High School chronic absenteeism: 27.7% — middle-of-pack but pairs directly with the building the bond would have replaced. East Valley Middle School: 21.8% chronic absenteeism. Both buildings the bond would raze show attendance problems above district average.
• District has 5 of 9 schools with a nurse, 4 without and 16.28 total nurse FTE — above peer median. EVSD is not a “starving the schools” district. The data story is “old buildings, modern operations” — and that’s a defensible narrative.

FMX peer operational benchmarks (live)

Pulled live from fmxFacilities for each confirmed FMX-customer peer above. These are the actual operational profiles East Valley is being measured against — and what the next campaign can cite directly.

Most peers above have partial snapshots — they’re FMX customers but several operational fields (sqft, cost-per-sqft, portfolio age) haven’t been backfilled yet. The presence of FMX-customer peers at high similarity is still the load-bearing outreach signal: comparable districts are on the platform; the FMX team should validate whether their data layer is mature enough to cite.

5. Bond history (Ballotpedia + Spokesman-Review)

• February 1996: ~$12M bond, passed → last successful bond
• 8 attempts 1996–2026: all failed to clear 60%
• 2013: $65M bond, 37% Yes — failed
• Feb 2026: $220M bond, 54.6% Yes — failed
• Apr 2026: District resubmitted the same measure — also failed (per Spokesman-Review Apr 28 coverage)

This is a 30-year bond drought. Eight consecutive attempts have failed under WA’s 60% rule. No bond passed since 1996 — but the trajectory is climbing: 37% (2013) → 54.6% (Feb 2026). The district is 5.4 points from breaking a 30-year curse. That’s the headline.

6. What voters / opposition actually said

The Spokesman-Review coverage carried Talbott’s superintendent statements (“This is not the way I wanted to leave East Valley”) but no organized opposition messaging. The Spokane County Republican Party endorsed this bond — a rare cross-aisle alignment for a tax measure in eastern Washington. With Republican Party endorsement plus 54.6% Yes, this isn’t a partisan opposition story or a tax-rebellion story. It’s the 60% rule defeating a clearly-majority-supported bond from a community with limited tax capacity.

7. What we could have told them

1. “In 30 years and 8 attempts, this district has never been closer than 5 percentage points from passing a bond. The buildings have aged 30 years while the campaigns have run with the same playbook. The data EVSD has on building condition is the new playbook.” Anchors on the historic significance and the marginal cost of one more attempt with better data.
2. “EVSD spends $1,498 per student keeping these 64- and 56-year-old buildings standing — 13% above the national median. We’re not asking to start spending on facilities; we’re asking to stop pouring money into buildings that should have been replaced a decade ago.” Defuses the most likely opposition argument before it gets traction.
3. “East Valley High had 28% chronic absenteeism last year. East Valley Middle: 22%. The two buildings this bond would replace are also the two buildings with the worst attendance in the district. New buildings correlate with kids showing up.” Pairs the building-replacement case with per-school CRDC data.
4. “West Valley, four miles away, has the same demographics, the same locale type, and similar per-pupil spending. They’re our most identical peer in the country. Their per-pupil instruction is $8,571; ours is $9,156. We’re protecting the classroom — but we’re losing the buildings around it.” The local comparison voters can verify.
5. Tax-impact framing tied to the actual median home value ($333,700) rather than abstractions. $220M bond × 21 years on a community with $64K median income needs the per-month dollar value front and center, not “for the price of a coffee.”

8. FMX outreach hook

East Valley now has 3 confirmed FMX-customer peers in the top 15 peer set. The outreach team has live proof points — these are not “likely customers, validate later,” they are named, opted-in, and their operational data is queryable today:

• Plum Borough SD (PA, 1902 mi, enrollment 3,556, 92% similarity) (pbsd.gofmx.com): work-order resolution 95.3%; HVAC is 15.6% of work orders; 9 buildings tracked.
• Ephrata Area SD (PA, 2079 mi, enrollment 3,918, 90% similarity) (easdpa.gofmx.com): work-order resolution 82.4%; HVAC is 2.2% of work orders; 13 buildings tracked.
• Upper Moreland Township SD (PA, 2130 mi, enrollment 3,550, 89% similarity) (umtsd.gofmx.com): work-order resolution 76.3%; HVAC is 10.6% of work orders; 8 buildings tracked.

Opener for the call: “Your top-similarity peers include Plum Borough SD (PA) and Ephrata Area SD (PA) — both already running FMX. They publish work-order resolution rates, HVAC burden, and per-building cost data your bond campaign couldn’t cite. We can have your portfolio benchmarked against them inside 60 days, in time for your next ballot ask.”

Lead the call against the contact named in the spreadsheet (Director of Operations / CFO / Superintendent as applicable). Validate the named FMX peers above against the internal customer list before outbound — these were resolved via the MCP unredacted endpoint on the local server.