Three Rivers School District — OR

1. Snapshot

Rural-Fringe district covering western Josephine County (Grants Pass area) and Cave Junction — 4,442 students across 17 schools spread across a large geographic footprint (the district covers most of rural Josephine County). The 17-school count is unusually high for the enrollment — driven by very small rural schools and charter campuses (Williams Elementary 77 students; Sunny Wolf 91; Applegate 92; Kalmiopsis HS 47). Demographics are heavily White (78%) with 12% Hispanic, reflecting the rural Southern Oregon corridor. SAIPE poverty 17.7% — the highest in this six-district brief set, and one of the highest in the failed-bond cohort nationally. Per-pupil expenditure $16,144 (FY2020) — boosted by the small-school footprint, not by genuine instructional investment.

The 74% No is the second-worst margin in the entire failed-bond cohort (after Shamong NJ at 75%) — and uniquely, this 74% rejected a modest $39M re-roofing-and-security ask, not a generation-defining new building. That makes Three Rivers different from every other district in this brief set.

2. Why this was a hard sell — community context (ACS)

The distinguishing pattern: lowest income / lowest education in this brief set, but the highest owner-occupied percentage (81.6%). This is rural Southern Oregon — a community of long-tenured homeowners with limited household income, where every new property-tax mil lands directly on the people most exposed to inflation in housing/insurance/medical costs. Per-pupil expenditure looks high ($16,144), but that’s an artifact of 17 schools serving 4,442 students — small-school overhead is the bind.

But the demographics alone don’t explain 74% No. North Kitsap WA had 64% No on $242M; Three Rivers got 74% No on $39M for roofs. That delta — 10 points worse, on 1/6th the dollar amount — is the unique signal. This is a community that has lost trust with its district, not a community that found the bond too expensive.

3. Peer comparison

Top peers identified via MCP (default weights + plantOps emphasis):

4. The gap story (what the data would have shown voters)

Three Rivers’ data is almost the opposite of what every other district in this brief set shows. Three Rivers is not under-invested in facilities — the bond was rejected anyway:

• Plant operations spending: $1,476.38 / pupil vs national median $1,324 — 11% above the national median. Three Rivers is investing more on plant ops per student than the national norm. The “we’re starving our buildings” narrative does not apply here.
• Per-pupil expenditure: $16,144 — above the cohort median, above 4 of 5 named peers. Three Rivers spends more than most rural peers.
• Capital construction outlay (FY2020): $1.78M — meaningful capital activity for a small district. Not zero like Central 13J.
• Utility/energy spend: $1.09M/yr — proportionate to enrollment.

The data the bond could have shown but didn’t translate:

• District chronic absenteeism: 48% — comparable to Central 13J. Several schools at 50%+: Hidden Valley HS 45%, North Valley HS 51%, Illinois Valley HS 54%, Lincoln Savage MS 52%, Evergreen Elem 54%, Applegate 60%, Sunny Wolf 62%.
• Counselor ratio district-wide: 1:280 — better than peer median (peer set 1:176–1:477). Three Rivers is staffing this dimension reasonably.
• 7 of 16 schools (44%) have no nurse (peer set median 6.25 nurse FTE; Three Rivers has 2 across 17 schools) — this is a real gap but it wasn’t in the bond’s framing.
• Total expulsions: 6 — well below peer median (9).
• Schools with no counselor: 8 of 17 (only 6 have a counselor on record).

Three Rivers’ problem is not its data — its problem is its relationship with voters. The campaign tried to thread a $39M roofs+security ask through a community that doesn’t trust the leadership team. The data is honest; it’s not enough.

5. Bond history (Ballotpedia + news)

• 2000: Last passed bond (per OSBA coverage). Three Rivers has not passed a capital ask in 24 years.
• Nov 5, 2024: $39M bond (Measure 17-123), failed ~26/74.

This is a 24-year drought punctuated by repeated rejection — closer in spirit to Chester County SC (4 consecutive bond failures) or Beloit WI (3 straight operating-referendum failures) than to a one-off campaign-design problem. OSBA reporting notes: “Three Rivers hasn’t passed a bond since 2000 and needs roof repairs on every building in the district.” The community-trust narrative is the diagnosis.

6. What voters / opposition actually said

Direct opposition arguments specific to Three Rivers are not in the public record — and that absence is itself diagnostic. A 74% No vote does not require organized opposition; it requires the absence of organized support. What the available coverage and the data combine to show:

• The bond was modest ($39M) and concrete (roofs + security cameras + a $6M state grant). Voters rejected it 3-to-1.
• No bond has passed in 24 years (since 2000).
• Per-pupil spending is at peer-set medians; this isn’t an under-resourcing campaign.
• The district has 17 schools for 4,442 students — voters in Cave Junction (Illinois Valley HS), Wolf Creek (Sunny Wolf), and Williams may feel their schools are different from “Grants Pass schools” — fragmentation of constituent identity.

The diagnosis is multi-year erosion of civic trust between the community and the district, not a one-cycle messaging failure. A re-designed $39M campaign with better mailers will not produce a 24-point swing from 26% Yes to 50% Yes.

7. What we could have told them — strategic, not tactical

Three Rivers is the one district in this brief set where the recommendation isn’t “redesign the campaign.” The recommendation is rebuild civic trust first; bond ask follows from that, not the other way around.

1. Multi-year, building-by-building public condition reporting — publish monthly per-school facility-condition dashboards (work orders, square-foot cost, HVAC age, roof age). Make the next bond ask follow publicly visible data, not lead it. This is the post-incident playbook Houston ISD needs and Three Rivers needs even more.
2. Decouple the 17-school portfolio — Cave Junction, Wolf Creek, Williams, and Applegate voters need to see their school’s data, not the district aggregate. The 17-school footprint is a political asset (if every small school can speak for itself) and a political liability (if the bond bundles them into one ask voters reject as “the district’s problem”).
3. The $6M state matching grant was contingent on the bond passing — and voters left $6M on the table. That’s the headline of the post-loss conversation: “We just rejected $6M in free money on a 3-to-1 vote.” Whoever can present that with the cold arithmetic of what the rejection actually cost may rebuild trust faster than yet another bond campaign.
4. Per-school chronic absenteeism + condition pairing — Sunny Wolf 62%, Applegate 60%, Evergreen 54%. The very smallest schools (the politically distinct ones) have the worst engagement numbers. That’s the local story that bundles into the district story.
5. Sequence the next 3 years: Year 1, publish data + decouple narratives. Year 2, run a single-purpose, single-school tiny capital ask (e.g., one elementary’s roof) — prove the campaign machinery can pass anything. Year 3, run the district-wide ask only after the small win.

Anything tactical that the campaign could have done differently in Nov 2024 — better mailers, more bilingual outreach, more specific projects — would not have moved 74% No to under 50%.

8. FMX outreach hook

Three Rivers is a long-runway, high-care, strategically-different prospect from the rest of this six-district set. The natural sales motion is not “help them win the next bond” — it’s “help them rebuild civic transparency before the next bond is even sensible.” That maps to a 12–24 month engagement on operational transparency and per-school facility dashboards, the same playbook recommended for Houston ISD in the pilot.

Best contact angle: Dave Valenzuela (Superintendent) directly, given the absence of named CFO/Facilities/Operations contacts in the spreadsheet — but the framing must be transparency, not efficiency. Opener: “You’re 24 years past your last passed bond. Your data is actually reasonable — $1,476/pupil plant ops is above the national median. The diagnosis isn’t under-spending; it’s the community has lost track of what their dollars buy. If you publish per-school facility-condition dashboards as a public good for 18 months — same approach FMX customers like [redacted PA peer = likely Spring Grove] use internally — your next bond ask follows the data instead of leading it. We can give you the dashboard template and the peer benchmarks for free; the win is when your community trusts a $39M ask again.”

The two redacted PA peers (likely Spring Grove Area SD + one more) and the VA/IN likely-FMX peers are the proof points — if any are current customers, that’s the cover for the transparency-first conversation. Do not lead with a sales motion. Lead with “we already help districts like yours publish this data publicly.” The win for FMX is being the vendor of record when Three Rivers passes its next bond in 2027–28, not selling them a system in 2026.