Wickliffe City School District — OH

1. Snapshot

Suburb-Large district in Lake County, on Lake Erie ~20 miles east of downtown Cleveland. 1,228 students across 3 active schools — Wickliffe Lower (PK-6, 642), Wickliffe Upper (7-12, 586), and a virtual academy with 0 reported enrollment. SAIPE poverty 12.0%. Demographics 65% White / 18% Black / 12% Multiracial / 5% Hispanic — meaningfully diverse for the cohort. Note: the FY2020 per-pupil expenditure of $2,869 reported in NCES is anomalously low — this is almost certainly a reporting artifact (likely a fund-segregation issue in CCD finance data), as 79% of revenue is local and total expenditures are far below any peer of similar size. Treat the plant ops figure of $295/pp with extreme caution.

2. Why this was a hard sell — community context (ACS)

This is an unusually homogeneous, homeowner-majority, lower-home-value community — exactly the type that votes against earned-income taxes because the median household pays a real cost and has no immediate offset. Per Chokshi’s quote in News 5, the median household at $79K would pay ~$790/year — roughly $66/month — and that is the political argument that defeated the November ask. The Gini index of 0.378 is meaningfully lower than every other district on your list (next-lowest: Madison-Mansfield 0.390), which means voters relate to each other’s tax burden directly. There’s no “the rich can afford it” coalitional politics available; the median voter is the tax-paying voter.

3. Peer comparison

The MCP peer output for Wickliffe is degraded by the per-pupil data anomaly — the top matches are all charter schools, virtual academies, and single-building “academies” in UT and PA where the per-pupil number is similarly under-reported. Treat the MCP output as unreliable for Wickliffe specifically. Manually-selected peers from the broader 7-district set and same-locale OH neighbors are more informative:

(MCP top-15 also returned 1 redacted “Peer District” entry in PA and 1 in OH (Gateway Online Academy 17 mi away), neither useful for outreach.)

4. The gap story (what the data would have shown voters)

The NCES data quality for Wickliffe is insufficient to make a clean under-investment claim without first reconciling the source. With that caveat:

• Reported plant operations spending: $295.06 / pupil — almost certainly under-reported. National median $1,324. The CCD finance file likely has a partition issue between operating funds and the bond-funded campus construction Chokshi referenced (“a bond issue approved seven years earlier for campus construction” — i.e., 2018).
• Capital construction outlay (FY2020): $434K — modest; the 2018 bond’s major outlays may have been booked in earlier years.
• 2015 was the last new operational funding per Chokshi.
• Chronic absenteeism: Lower School 13.2%, Upper School 10.2% — both below peer medians, which is unusual for the failed-levy cohort. Wickliffe is academically not in crisis. The bond pitch isn’t “schools are failing”; it’s “we’re efficient and we still can’t make ends meet.”
• Counselor ratio 293:1 — better than the peer median (~378:1). Wickliffe is doing more with less.
• 3 nurse FTE across 3 buildings, 2.5 security FTE — staffed at peer levels, not luxuriously.
• HS suspension 9.6%, lower-school 0.9% — clean discipline picture relative to peers.

Per Chokshi: announced cuts after the 2025 failures included 32 positions, elimination of full-day kindergarten, busing and electives cut to state minimums, all sports converted to pay-to-play at $1,200/student-athlete. A 2004 graduate donated $95K to cover spring sports. Then voters passed the May 2026 ask by ~100 votes — the only NE Ohio income tax to pass that cycle.

5. Levy history

• 2015: Last new operational funding approved
• 2018 (approx.): Campus construction bond, passed
• May 2025: Income tax, failed (1st attempt)
• Nov 2025: 1% earned-income tax, failed (2nd attempt)
• May 2026: Income tax, PASSED by ~100 votes — only NE Ohio income tax to pass that cycle

Wickliffe is the comeback story of the cohort. Two failures, announced catastrophic cuts (full-day K elimination, sports → $1,200 pay-to-play), a public alumni donation to cover sports, and a successful third attempt. That’s the pattern districts elsewhere on this list need to learn from.

6. What voters / opposition actually said

Chokshi’s framing in the News 5 piece: “The kids are going to lose out on opportunities, and our kids are not going to be as competitive as kids in other districts if we don’t pass this.” Treasurer Lou Galante added: inflation has reduced purchasing power by approximately 30% over five years despite flat state funding.

What worked between Nov 2025 and May 2026: - Concrete, visible cuts went into effect — pay-to-play sports actually happened - A community-visible donation ($95K from a 2004 graduate) made the stakes tangible to voters who didn’t have kids in the district - Specific position counts (32 positions cut) replaced abstract “we’ll have to make difficult choices” language

This is a campaign-design lesson: vague threats fail twice; specific cuts that materialize between elections move the third vote.

7. What we could have told them (and what they ultimately got right)

1. “We’ve already cut to the bone. 32 positions. Full-day K gone. $1,200 to play a sport. We’re not asking for more; we’re asking to keep what’s left.” This is what the May 2026 ask carried that the November ask didn’t.
2. “Our last new operational funding was 2015. State funding is flat. Inflation has eroded our purchasing power 30%.” Treasurer Galante framed this correctly.
3. NCES data anomaly: the next campaign should reconcile the FY2020 finance reporting so the peer-comparison story is defensible. Right now, claims about plant-ops spending can’t be made without the data being challenged.
4. Build the alumni-donation playbook. The $95K from a 2004 grad was campaign rocket fuel. That’s reproducible.
5. Document what changed between Nov 2025 and May 2026 — this district just ran a textbook recovery campaign and the data-driven artifacts are worth capturing as a case study.

8. FMX outreach hook

Wickliffe is the most time-sensitive prospect on this list — they just won their levy and have a 5-year window before the next operational ask. The pitch isn’t “help you pass the next levy”; it’s “help you defend the trust you just rebuilt.” Contact unit: Mike Chokshi (Superintendent), Lou Galante (Treasurer, per news), Jeff Davis (Facility Manager — named in your spreadsheet).

Lead with Jeff Davis — the named facility manager is unusual for a district this size, which means there’s existing ownership of operations data. Mike Chokshi is the close-second contact because he personally ran the comeback campaign and will understand the “next campaign needs data” pitch instantly.

Opener: “Congratulations on the May 2026 win — only NE Ohio income tax to pass that cycle. The work isn’t done: in five years you go back to voters with no 2025 failure memory to draw on, and the FY2020 NCES finance reporting that fueled the No campaigns has a data problem that needs reconciling. The next pitch needs per-building condition scores and work-order data that show you’ve spent the new dollars right. We can have your portfolio benchmarked against Streetsboro, Niles, Poland — same-locale OH peers all on the failed-bond list — within 60 days. The alumni donation from a 2004 grad showed there’s community emotional investment; we make that investment legible to skeptics in 2030.”

Note: the spreadsheet date of Nov 4, 2025 reflects the failure — but Wickliffe’s status changed materially in May 2026. Any sales conversation should lead with the win, not the loss.